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Abstract
While Federal Reserve continues to normalize its monetary policy on the back of a
strengthening U.S. economy, the possibility of mimicking U.S. policy actions and so the
debate of monetary autonomy has been particularly heated in the most of developing
countries, even in advanced economies. We analyse the role played by country-specific
characteristics in domestic monetary policy autonomy to set short-term interest rates in
the face of spillovers from of U.S. monetary policy as global external shocks. First, we
extricate the non-systematic (non-autonomous) component of domestic interest rates
which is related to business cycle synchronisation across countries. Then we employ an
interacted panel VAR model, which allows impulse response functions to vary by coun-
try characteristics for a broad sample of countries. We find strong empirical evidence
for the role of exchange rate flexibility, capital account openness in line with trilemma,
but also a significant role for other country characteristics, such as dollarisation in the
financial system, the presence of a global bank, use of macroprudential policies, and
the credibility of fiscal and monetary policy.
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1 Introduction
As the U.S. economic outlook has strengthened in the last three years, the Federal Reserve is
preparing to raise policy rates for the first time in almost a decade. Monetary authorities in
the developing countries have been considering the possibility of mimicking U.S. policy ac-
tions. Monetary authorities are expected to set their interest rate to achieve their objectives
of domestic output and price stability. However, global financial shocks may limit the ability
of central banks to fulfill domestic objectives. For instance, we find significant spillovers from
U.S. monetary policy to advanced and emerging market economies, in particular on interest
rates1. This can be interpreted as monetary policy in these countries being constrained to
some extent by foreign developments.
As the U.S. exit from quantitative easing, the debate about monetary autonomy has been
most heated in developing countries. However, it also concerns advanced economies. The
issue of monetary autonomy is one of the fundamental issues in the open macroeconomic and
policy literature. The literature has postulated conventional ”policy trilemma or impossible
trinity” which states that it impossible to jointly pursue three objectives: i) free international
capital mobility, ii) fixed exchange rate and iii) monetary autonomy2. Policymakers can
maintain only two of the three objectives mutually and they must decide which one to give
up. Thus, countries with fully open capital markets and tightly fixed exchange rates forego
all monetary autonomy.
On the other side, Rey (2015) argues that the global financial cycle3 transforms the
trilemma into a “dilemma”: monetary autonomy is possible if and only if the capital account
is controlled directly or indirectly. She finds that U.S. monetary policy -as an important
determinant of the global financial cycle- determines domestic financial conditions regardless
of exchange rate regime and emerging market economies can loose monetary autonomy unless
they impose capital controls.
In this study, we attempt to shed light on the ability of open economies to implement
autonomous monetary policy by addressing the following questions: i) Can monetary au-
thorities in small open economies maintain control of their monetary stance in the face of
spillovers from a large open economy like the U.S. or a tightening of global financial con-
ditions that is not warranted by their domestic cycle?, and ii) What policies can help
monetary authorities regain more autonomy vis-à-vis global financial shocks like tightening
in U.S. monetary policy?
1See IMF (2013), Chen et al. (2014), Aizenman et al. (2016), Demir (2019)
2See Obstfeld and Taylor (2004) for theoretical details.
3The global financial cycle can be defined as the widespread co-movement in capital flows, asset prices
and credit growth across countries.
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In this highly integrated global financial world domestic financial conditions become syn-
chronised with the conditions of international financial markets. For instance, countries
with strong trade and financial linkages to the United States, such as Canada and Mex-
ico, will tend to have an economic cycle that is highly synchronised with the U.S. cycle.
These synchronised economic cycle may reflect commonality of monetary policy stance in
such countries with United States. We first must distinguish between synchronisation and
spillovers from the U.S. to domestic interest rates based on the methodology proposed in
Caceres et al. (2016). While synchronisation corresponds to the correlation between for-
eign and domestic rates, spillovers are defined as movements in domestic short-term interest
rates that do not correspond to central banks seeking to achieve the objectives of domestic
output and price stability, and that can be attributed to changes in U.S. rates. We asso-
ciate the interest rate spillovers with impaired monetary autonomy. Monetary autonomy
can be defined as the insulation of monetary policy decisions made by an domestic authority
from short-term influences of the global financial shocks such as U.S. monetary shocks. In
other words, it implies setting policy interest rates according to developments in domestic
economy, where financial conditions abroad constrains policy decisions. It is expected that
degree of monetary autonomy is low where spillovers are high. We then investigate how
determinants (country-specific characteristics) of monetary autonomy affect the degree of
monetary autonomy in a small open economy.
We use an interacted panel VAR approach, as in Towbin and Weber (2013), for 30
countries since the early 2000s. The interaction of variables with the country-specific char-
acteristics allows the model parameters to deterministically vary across time and countries.
Therefore we can evaluate the model coefficients at specific values of country-specific char-
acteristics. We then compare impulse responses evaluated at high and low level of country
characteristics to test how country characteristics affect the degree of monetary autonomy
to external shocks. We find that, consistently with the classical monetary trilemma in open
economies, exchange rate flexibility plays the key role in ensuring that the central bank can
gear monetary policy to a greater degree towards stabilising the domestic economy. In turn,
opening the capital account increases the degree of spillover for a country with a flexible
exchange rate regime. The exchange rate regimes and capital openness alone do not insulate
economies from foreign monetary developments. Furthermore, stronger policy frameworks,
an active use of reserve requirements, and lower financial dollarisation are also associated
with greater autonomy.
Monetary autonomy has been studied by Obstfeld (2015), Obstfeld et al. (2005) and
many others. This empirical study differs from the prior literature in three ways. First, we
eliminate the synchronised component in domestic interest rates and focus on pure spillovers.
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Second, most of these studies mainly only focus on exchange rate regime and capital open-
ness, whereas we cover different fundamentals such as financial dollarisation, macroprudential
policy and CDS. Third, they estimate their models and calculate impulse response functions
across two groups of countries that are classified according to the level of fundamentals
and they assume model impulse responses are homogenous within group but heterogeneous
across groups. In contrast, we do not group countries but allow fundamentals in the model
as interaction terms to have deterministically varying coefficients across time and countries.
Thus, the model parameters vary by level of fundamentals so impulse response functions can
be directly analysed for different levels of fundamentals.
The structure of this chapter proceeds as follows: Section 2 presents the empirical
methodology and data used in the analysis. Section 3 presents impulse response analysis
for U.S. monetary policy shock and explores which policies may help improve the degree of
monetary policy autonomy in small open economies for different levels of country character-
istics. It also shows how results are robust for different measures of monetary policy and the
pre-zero lower bound (ZLB) period. Section 4 concludes and discusses policy implications.
2 Empirical methodology:
2.1 Model and estimation:
We estimate a recursive Interacted-Panel VAR (IPVAR) model as described in Towbin and
Weber (2013). The framework can be considered as a generalised panel VAR regression in
which each right hand side variable can vary deterministically with structural country-specific
characteristics4. The model is given in the following representation:
 1 0 0α210 1 0
α310,it α
32
0,it 1

 V IXi,t∆iFFRi,t
ûsi,t
 = Γ′Xit + 2∑
j=1
 α
11
j α
12
j 0
α21j α
22
j 0
α31j,it α
32
j,it α
33
j,it

 V IXi,t−j∆iFFRi,t−j
ûsi,t−j
 + εi,t (1)
where εi,t ∼ N(0,Σi.t).
with time index t = 1...T , i = 1...N denotes countries. External variables include
V IXi,t which is a global risk sentiments or global uncertainty proxied by the VIX Index as
well as ∆iFFRi,t which is changes in U.S. federal funds rate; and domestic variables include û
s
i,t
4In distinction from the standard VAR models, IPVAR adds the cross-sectional of data set and, thus it
allows to exploit the heterogeneous information in cross-country which is the one of the aim of this study.
It also increases the sample size and degree of freedom to reduce the risk over-fitting and to eliminate
idiosyncratic effects (Gavin and Theodorou (2005))
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which is the unexplained component of domestic interest rates that can be interpreted as
deviations from the historical policy reaction function that characterises the central bank’s
efforts to achieve its domestic output and inflation stabilisation objective56. Xi.t is a matrix
of the vector of controls that includes country-specific intercepts and levels of country-specific
characteristics; and ε
i,t
is a vector of residuals that are assumed to be uncorrelated across
countries and normally distributed with a covariance matrix Σi,t. αj,it are deterministically
varying coefficients as by time and with given country-specific characteristics7.
We identify external shocks with a small open economy assumption in the traditional
international macroeconomics literature: the external variables (V IX and iFFR) can affect
domestic variables (ûs) but the external variables do not depend on domestic variables (α13j =
α23j = 0 for all j), implying exogeneity. Furthermore, we assume that the external variables
are contemporaneously unaffected by domestic conditions (α120 = α
13
0 = α
23
0 = 0). This
partial identification scheme is sufficient to identify shocks to the interested external variable,
iFFR.
In order to investigate how responses vary with country-specific characteristics, we allow
for interactions terms in the model. More precisely, the coefficients in equation system (1)
are given by:
αklj,it = γ
kl
j + β
kl
j Fi,t (2)
where Fi,t is a vector of country-specific characteristics that vary across countries and
across time. Therefore slope coefficients,αklj,it are varying across cross-sections, and over
time. However, if country-specific characteristics are the same, the slope coefficient will be
homogeneous as in the standard panel VAR models. Allowing interaction terms in our model
suggests that domestic interest rates are modeled not only as a function of their own lags,
the contemporaneous and lagged U.S. rate, and VIX, but also of interactions between these
terms with country-specific characteristics. However, we restrict the dynamics of external
5These unexplained interest rate movements could reflect other objectives of the central bank beyond
preserving price stability, including financial stability concerns, and thus could well be welfare-enhancing.
Nonetheless, they entail changes in domestic monetary conditions beyond what can be attributed to the
central bank’s usual response to inflation and output developments. See appendix for details and estimation
of ûsi.t using multi-stage VAR proposed in Caceres et al. (2016)
6We enter V IXi,t in the model as an external variable to capture unobserved global financial shocks that
might affect global interest rate, and thus domestic and U.S. interest rates simultaneously. For instance,
changes in global risk tolerance may simultaneously move the domestic and U.S. rates in the same direction,
so omitting this variable raises a biased estimate problem since there is a positive correlation between residual
and domestic rate.
7In this model, coefficient-variation is parameterised as a function of structural country-specific elements,
in contrast to other studies in the literature using single country VARs that allow model coefficients to vary
stochastically (see, for example, Primiceri (2005) and many others).
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variables to be independent of country characteristics (αklj,it = γ
kl
j for all l while k = {1, 2}).
In other words, they are only a function of their own lags and the lags of each other.
Although single coefficients αklj,it cannot be interpreted as in VAR models, we can evaluate
the coefficients at specific values of country-specific characteristics and then compute impulse
responses. Evaluations are taken at a lower value (defined as the 10th percentile of values
realised in the sample) and a higher values (defined as the 90th percentile of values realised
in the sample) for continuous variables; at three (floating) and one (fix) for the exchange
rate regime.
One important feature of our model is that it includes the country fixed effects, Xi.t,
to control for unobserved heterogeneity among countries. However, estimating the model
with country fixed effects only allows for heterogeneous intercepts but imposes homogeneous
slope (Pesaran and Smith (1995)). They suggest to use the mean group estimator to address
this problem for estimation country-by-country. Since we investigate the sources of cross-
country dynamic heterogeneity, this approach is not suitable for us. We are allowing slope
coefficients to differ with country-specific characteristics that enter as the interaction terms
in the model. The use of interaction term should therefore alleviate the slope heterogeneity
bias.
Since the error terms εi,t are uncorrelated across equations by construction the interacted
Panel VAR can be estimated using OLS with allowing country fixed effects. We can estimate
system (1) equation by equation without loss in efficiency. Estimating the recursive form of
the model provides a simple way to parameterise the covariance matrix of the reduced form
residual and, therefore, the variation in the contemporaneous relationship of the endogenous
variables as a function of country and time-varying structural characteristics. Employing
the equivalent OLS procedure to the reduced form would keep the off-diagonal elements
of the covariance matrix constant. The recursive model may correspond to the structural
identification scheme.8
We use bootstrapped standard errors, which are more accurate than analytical standard
errors that rely on first order asymptotic, since the impulse response functions are a nonlinear
function of the OLS estimates. The bootstrapping procedure’s steps are as follows: (i) es-
timate model (1) by OLS, (ii) draw randomly residuals from normal distribution N(0, Σ̂),
where Σ̂ is estimated covariance matrix, (iii) simulate recursively dependent variables, Ŷi,t
using drawn residual, previous observation of dependent variables and estimates of α̂klj,it and
values of iteration terms at time t, (iv) repeat step (ii) and (iii) for t = 1...T and i = 1...N ,
8In principle, the reduced form estimates will depend on the ordering of the variables in the recursive VAR,
as Primiceri (2005) discusses. Estimating the model with several orderings and assessing sensitivity could
address this problem. Note that this is not the case in our model since the recursive ordering corresponds
to the structural ordering.
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(v) use the obtained artificial sample and interaction terms to re-estimate the model coeffi-
cients, (vi) compute impulse response functions, and (vii) step (ii) to (v) are repeated 1000
times. We compute 90% confidence interval from the simulated estimates.
We use monthly data from a sample of 30 advanced and emerging market economies (see
Table 1 for a list of the countries included in the IPVAR model). We estimate the model
using monthly data from January 2000 to October 2015, evaluate the coefficients in equation
(2) at different values for the country characteristics and then compute impulse response
functions.
2.2 Data:
The data consist of monthly observations from 2000:01 to 2015:10 on a set of 30 emerging and
advanced countries, at monthly frequency9. The series can be grouped into three categories:
short-term interest rates; expectations about economic activity and inflation; and country-
specific characteristics.
As short-term interest rate, we choose the federal funds rate for the U.S and interest
rates on short-term government bonds (with maturity of about three months), rather than
monetary policy or money market rates for domestic countries. The following two consid-
erations drive this decision. First, policy rates are often discontinuous for long time series
since the choice of policy instrument changes over time. For example, Chile changed its
policy rate from a real rate to a nominal rate in August 2001. Second, money market rates
are available but usually more homogeneous across countries. Variation in them may be
unrelated to monetary policy; for instance, unexpected liquidity shortages can lead to large
spikes in nominal interest rates despite unchanged monetary policy.
Ideally, the central bank’s internal forecasts are preferable for use as expectations since
they are more informative about the policy decisions made. However, these are not publicly
available for a few countries and with a significant delay. In this study, we use 12-months-
ahead forecasts of inflation and output growth, as reported by Consensus Economics10.
We employ eight different country-specific characteristics suggested by the literature11.
We use exchange rate regimes that correspond to the coarse classification adopted by Ilzetzki
et al. (2017). The financial openness index is from Aizenman et al. (2010). We construct an
index of central bank credibility based on forecast disagreement and sovereign CDS spreads
to capture perceived fiscal risks in domestic countries. For a measure of macroprudential
9The countries in the sample are listed in the Table 1 in the Appendix
10Actual data can be used but forward-looking indicators allow researchers to control for domestic condi-
tions at monthly frequency rather than quarterly.
11See Appendix 5.2 for further details on country characteristics.
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policies, we use the index constructed by Cordella et al. (2014) that is based on the frequency
with which reserve requirements are adjusted. The financial dollarisation index proposed in
Yeyati (2006) is also used. It is based on the share of bank deposits denominated in foreign
currency. We use a metric that captures the role of global banks in the provision of the
domestic credit market. Lastly, we use the share of sovereign debt held by foreigners data
constructed by Ebeke and Kyobe (2015).
Our primary data sources are generic bond estimates provided by Bloomberg and the
series for treasury bills and government bond yields provided by the IMF’s International
Financial Statistics. While sources vary by country, instrument and time period, we supple-
ment these primary sources with data from the IMF’s monetary surveys, Haver Analytics,
Global Financial Data, and national authorities12.
3 Results:
The monetary policy autonomy of small open economies has been discussed in the literature.
3.1 The trilemma’s pillars: exchange rate flexibility and capital
openness:
We first estimate the model with only two fundamentals in Fi,t capturing the exchange
rate regime and the degree of financial openness, the two pillars underlying the traditional
monetary trilemma. Figure 1 shows the cumulative response of domestic rates over two years
to 100 basis points cumulative increase in U.S. federal funds rate using different exchange
rate regimes and different level of capital openness.
We expected that a country that maintains a fixed exchange rate regime to raise interest
rates in response to contractionary policy shocks, to avoid interest rate differential by defi-
nition. On the other hand, a country that has a floating exchange rate regime could absorb
part of the effect of shocks on the domestic interest rate by allowing their local currency to
depreciate against the base currency.
We find that, indeed, the predictions of the trilemma remain valid. Figure 1, panel A,
shows monetary policy spillovers under different exchange rate regimes, while conditioning
on high financial openness. Maintaining a flexible exchange rate sharply decreases the degree
of spillovers from the U.S. to domestic interest rates. The cumulative spillover response after
a 12-month period declines from almost 35 basis points under a fixed exchange rate to about
13 basis points under a floating exchange rate and disappears under a fully flexible regime
12See Appendix for further details of data construction and country-level data sources.
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Figure 1: Testing the trilemma’s hypothesis
Note: The charts show the cumulative monetary policy spillover (as defined in the text) to a 100-basis
cumulative increase in the U.S. federal funds rate. Panel A shows monetary policy spillovers (basis
points) under different exchange rate regimes, conditional on having high financial openness.Panel B
shows monetary policy spillovers (basis points) under different degrees of financial openness, conditional
having a floating exchange rate regime. The solid line reports the median response, conditional on the
fundamental values. The dotted line show a 90 percent confidence interval, calculated based on standard
bootstrapping.
(the response is 3 basis points but it is insignificant at the 90 per cent confidence level). The
differences between the three impulse response functions are statistically significant. These
findings are therefore in line with the classical argument of trilemma and consistent with
studies that show validation of the trilemma by Obstfeld (2015) and Klein and Shambaugh
(2015).
Allowing exchange rates to float can be helpful to absorb some global financial shocks
but might not provide full insulation against disturbances from abroad. In turn, opening the
capital account increases the degree of monetary spillovers to domestic countries. Figure 1,
panel B, shows monetary policy spillovers for different degrees of capital openness while
conditioned on having a floating exchange rate regime. The cumulative spillover response
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declines from 13 to 6 basis points when the degree of financial openness moves from the
ninth decile in our sample (corresponding to fully open) to the median, and to -7 (but
indistinguishable from zero) when it moves to the first decile.
We find that the traditional policy trilemma is valid, and floating exchange rate regime
and controls on capital flows allow monetary policy autonomy. However, it is not a full
tradeoff between the trilemma pillars: free international capital mobility, fixed exchange rate
and monetary autonomy. More exchange rate flexibility and imposing more prohibitions
on international capital flows allow a greater degree of monetary autonomy against the
development in monetary conditions in abroad.
3.2 Looking beyond the trilemma: do other factors matter?
In this section, we extend the model to account for a third fundamental in Fi,t and explore
how the monetary policy spillover response varies by the third fundamental while condi-
tioned on a floating exchange rate regime and high financial openness. Figure 2 shows the
cumulative response of spillovers over two years to 100 basis points cumulative increase in
U.S. federal funds rate, changing the third fundamental’s value from the first to ninth decile.
Financial dollarisation: The financial dollarisation might affect the monetary auton-
omy and transmission mechanism in domestic countries. It reduces the ability of balance
sheets to absorb large exchange rate swings driven by external financial shocks. When resi-
dents and banks hold substantial volumes of assets and liabilities in foreign currency, central
banks exert less control on the domestic interest rate and the exchange rate becomes an
important issue in conducting monetary policy Fischer et al. (2013). Consequently, central
banks in countries with a higher degree of financial dollarization may be more concerned
about letting the exchange rate react to rising U.S. rates. We explore this by using an up-
dated version of the financial dollarisation index proposed in Yeyati (2006), which is proxied
by the share of bank deposits denominated in foreign currency. Our estimates in Figure 2
suggest that reducing financial dollarisation from 40 per cent—the level observed in Israel
over our estimation sample—to the first decile level in our sample (about 2 per cent), de-
creases the extent of spillovers by almost 7 basis points in response to a U.S. monetary
tightening. While this difference may seem small, it should be noted that it corresponds to a
rather limited reduction in the degree of dollarisation, from 40 percent to 2 per cent. Some
countries in our sample have a much larger degree of dollarisation (e.g., is about 92 per cent
in Bolivia and 80 percent in Peru in the early 2000s).
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Reserve requirement activity: Monetary policy in major advanced economies and
related international financial conditions has possible adverse effects on financial stability in
other countries through their impacts on global asset prices and capital flows. The use of
macroprudential policies has been often posited as a strengthening tool in the face of these
external financial shocks that can threaten macroeconomic stability since the onset of the
global financial crisis. Central banks may use macroprudential policies in contexts where
adjusting policy rates to offset the effect of global financial conditions on capital flows is at
odds with the output and price stability objectives. An interesting question then is whether
the active use of macroprudential policies has helped countries to reduce negative spillovers
and attain greater monetary autonomy.
The challenge is finding measures of macroprudential policies that capture not only their
use or lack of use, but also the intensity with which those policies are implemented. Here
we use the index constructed by Cordella et al. (2014) that is based on the frequency with
which reserve requirements are adjusted13. We find that, indeed, movingfrom the first to the
ninth decile in terms of the intensity with which reserve requirements are used is associated
with a smaller monetary spillover in about 14 basis points.
Presence of global banks in financial system: The structure of the domestic finan-
cial system and, in particular, the presence of global banks may affect the way monetary
policy responds to changes in global financial conditions. A large share of foreign banks in
a domestic financial system amplifies the effects of monetary shocks in advanced economies,
notably U.S., on local liquidity conditions. Wu et al. (2011) find evidence that, as the
level of foreign bank penetration increases, loan supply becomes less responsive to domes-
tic monetary policy conditions and foreign banks adjust loan and deposit growth rates less
than domestic banks in the face of domestic shocks. Goldberg (2013) finds some evidence
that the presence of global banks may affect monetary autonomy, although the effects are
heterogeneous—probably reflecting different business models of global banks—and relatively
minor compared to those of the exchange rate regime. Here we use an analogous metric that
captures the role of global banks in the provision of domestic credit and find that a stronger
presence of global banks (that is, moving from the first to the ninth decile of its distribution
in our sample is associated with a slightly larger spillover (but only about 6 basis points).
Central Bank Credibility Index: We first explore how the strength of the monetary
frameworks may affect the extent of monetary policy spillovers from abroad. Following a rise
in U.S. rates, a less credible central bank may need to deliver a larger interest rate movement
to convince agents that the exchange rate depreciation following an opening interest rate
13The direction of reserve requirement change and the used prudential instrument matter, but this index
does not cover all of this information.
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differential will not lead to significant second round effects in inflation. To explore this, we
construct an index of central bank credibility based on forecast disagreement (see Appendix
5.2 for details). We find that, conditional on the exchange rate regime and the degree of
financial openness, moving the proxies for the strength of the monetary and fiscal frameworks
from the first to the ninth decile of their distribution in our sample, in each case, to a decrease
in spillovers of close to 8 basis points (see Figure 2).
Credit default swap (CDS) spreads: We also explore how the strength of the fiscal
frameworks may affect the extent of monetary policy spillovers. Countries with larger per-
ceived fiscal vulnerabilities and default risk may be more susceptible to capital outflows after
an increase in U.S. rates, prompting a larger increase in domestic rates. We use sovereign
CDS spreads to capture perceived fiscal and credit risks. We find that, conditional on the
floating exchange rate regime and the degree of financial openness, moving the proxy for
the strength of the fiscal frameworks from the first to the ninth decile of the distribution in
our sample leads to a decrease in spillovers of close to 11 basis points (see Figure 2). The
result for CDS spreads is consistent with the findings in Bowman et al. (2015) regarding
the response of long-term domestic interest rates to unconventional monetary shocks in the
United States.
Foreign ownership of public debt: The share of sovereign debt in domestic cur-
rency that is held by foreigners has been increasing substantially over the last few years,
especially in emerging market economies. In this context, portfolio rebalancing by interna-
tional investors following a rise in U.S. rates can be potentially more harmful in terms of
capital outflows. Central banks may then need to raise policy rates in an attempt to at-
tenuate outflow pressures, irrespective of domestic macro conditions. With this in mind, we
assessed whether monetary spillovers vary depending on the share of sovereign debt held by
foreigners, using the data constructed by Ebeke and Kyobe (2015). Surprisingly, we found
the opposite but insignificant effect in this sample.
3.3 Robustness analysis:
A potential problem with our estimates is that U.S. policy rates have remained unchanged
at the zero lower bound since end-2008. However, most central banks elsewhere exhibited
large positive interest rates, which enabled them to increase or decrease their domestic policy
rates whilst the Fed Fund rates remained constant. Given that policy rates in the United
States have been at the zero lower bound since end-2008, we conducted the same exercise
and re-estimated the model with data up to June 2009. The results, in terms of the role
played by the exchange rate and the degree of financial openness, remain broadly unchanged
12
(see Figure 3)14.
As an alternative to U.S. policy rate, we re-estimate our model with exogenously identified
narrative monetary policy shock for U.S. measured by Romer and Romer (2004)15. Our
results are qualitatively consistent as can be seen in the Figure 4.
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Figure 3: Testing the trilemma’s hypothesis before ZLB
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Figure 4: Testing the trilemma’s hypothesis for Romer and Romer shocks
4 Conclusion and policy implications:
We empirically assess the autonomy of monetary policy in small open economies against to
shocks to U.S. monetary policy using an Interacted Panel VAR by allowing the response to
14The results for other factors are can be seen in the Appendix
15The identified monetary policy shocks for United States in the previous chapter could be used, but they
are on quarterly basis
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vary with country-specific characteristics for a large sample of countries. First, we remove
synchronisation between domestic and U.S. interest rates that corresponds to the correlation
due to common global factors like uncertainty to focus on pure spillovers of U.S. monetary
policy. It is expected that spillovers are low where monetary autonomy is high. We then
investigate the role of country-specific characteristics that change by time and across country,
in terms of the degree of monetary autonomy in a small open economy.
We provide empirical evidence that the magnitude of the spillovers from U.S. monetary
policy also appears to depend on the economic policy framework that is in place and other
country-specific characteristics. Our results confirm that exchange rate flexibility plays an
important role in ensuring greater monetary autonomy, even when the capital account is
unrestricted. Countries with more flexible exchange rates will be better prepared to cope
with the challenges posed by the developments in global external shocks. Our results also
suggest that, for a given policy choice along the capital account openness and exchange rate
flexibility dimensions, improving the credibility of policy frameworks, reducing the extent of
financial dollarisation, and using macroprudential reserve requirements may help achieve a
higher degree of monetary autonomy. Some of these other dimensions may be very relevant
for some particular countries, however they seem to play a more modest role compared to
the exchange rate regime.
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5 Appendix
5.1 Estimation of unexplained domestic interest rate movements
Synchronization or spillovers in short-term interest rates?
Short-term interest rates from both advanced and emerging market economies tend to
exhibit a positive correlation with the global interest rate16 in most countries (an average
correlation of about 0.83). However, this synchronicity of interest rates may simply reflect
a high degree of co-movement in business cycles across countries. In other words these
fluctuations tend to mimic the variations in synchronization of business cycles across coun-
tries. All countries in our sample exhibit a positive correlation of real GDP growth with the
corresponding global component of real GDP.
In particular, we are interested in ”pure monetary policy spillovers from U.S. interest
rates” that can be defined as movements in domestic short-term interest rates that do not
correspond to the central bank seeking to achieve the objectives of domestic output and price
stability, and that can be attributed to changes in U.S. rates. To eliminate interest rate fluc-
tuations tend to mimic the variations in synchronization of business cycles across countries,
we follow the multi-stage VAR procedure proposed in Caceres et al. (2016). This approach is
consistent with estimating a Taylor-type rule for the dynamic relationship between domestic
interest rates and domestic macro conditions.
We estimate the following country-specific VAR model for individual domestic country:
[
Xst
∆ist
]
= Φ0 +
∑2
j=1 Φj
[
Xst−j
∆ist−j
]
+
[
εX
s
t
εi
s
t
]
where is is the nominal domestic short-term interest rate in the small economy and Xs
is a vector including changes in domestic macroeconomic conditions (expectations of output
and inflation) in the small economy. We then take the residual from the above equation
(which essentially purges the interest rate from the effects of the lags of Xs) and regress it
on the other residuals (vector ε̂X
s
):
ε̂i
s
t = φ0 + φ1ε̂
Xs
t + u
is
t
ui
s
t is the unexplained components can be interpreted as deviations from the historical
policy reaction function that characterizes the central bank’s efforts to achieve its domestic
output and inflation stabilization objective.
16In order to calculate global component of short-term interest rate(real GDP growth), we use a principal
component analysis of short-term interest rates (real GDP growth) for countries in our sample.
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5.2 Data and Sources
Exchange rate regimes: The classification is from is from Ilzetzki et al. (2017) and updated
version is available on Carmen Reinhart’s website. They use parallel market data and assesses
the conditional probability an exchange rate will move outside a certain range over a five
year window. See Ilzetzki et al. (2017) for greater details.
Capital account openness: It is a de jure index of capital account openness from
Aizenman et al. (2010). The index is based on information regarding restrictions in the
International Monetary Fund’s Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange
Restrictions. Specifically, it is the first standardized principal component of the variables
that indicate restrictions on current account transactions, on capital account transactions,
and the requirement of the surrender of export proceeds. See Aizenman et al. (2010) for
more details.
Central Bank Credibility Index: Forecast disagreement has commonly been used as
a proxy of inflation uncertainty, which reflects both the predictability and credibility of the
central bank, as well as the variability of supply and demand shocks affecting the economy.
Inflation forecast disagreement is moreover closely related to de jure measure of central bank
independence in G7 economies. In this study, we then use the degree of anchoring of inflation
expectations to construct an index for central bank credibility. More precisely, the central
bank credibility index CBCi,t for country i at time t is constructed as an ordinal ranking of
the inverse disagreement among forecasters (measured as the 4-year moving average of the
standard deviation of inflation forecasts reported by Consensus Economics, MA48(σi,t));
CBCi,t =
1
N
[
1
MA48(σi,t)
]
Financial dollarization: It is proposed by Yeyati (2006) and is based on the share of
bank deposits denominated in foreign currency.
Reserve requirement activity: It is constructed by Cordella et al. (2014) that is based
on frequency of active use of reserve requirements as a macroprudential tool for financial
stability concerns. The main idea behind their operational definition is following: if the
average duration between the changes in reserve requirements for a country is shorter than
the average duration of the business cycle in the same country, it will be classified as having
an active reserve requirement. Otherwise, it has a passive reserve requirement.
Presence of global banks in financial system: It an analogous metric to Goldberg
(2013) that captures the role of global banks in the provision of domestic credit. It is
computed as share of foreign bank claims on local residents from the BIS Consolidated
Banking Statistics relative to total domestic credit from IFS database.
18
Foreign ownership of public debt: It is constructed by Ebeke and Kyobe (2015) and
is based on share of sovereign debt hold by foreigners. See Ebeke and Kyobe (2015) for more
details.
Table 1: Sample of countries
Advanced Emerging
AUS JPN ARG IND THA
CAN KOR BOL MEX TUR
CHE LVA BRA MYS ZAF
CZE NOR CHL NGA
DNK NZL COL PER
GBR SGP CRI PHL
ISR SWE IDN POL
Country classification in this table is based
on IMF’s income group classification.
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